was overshadowed by the internationalist rhetoric of the Comintern and the nationalist discourse of the PCF's anti-fascist front. In this article, I shall seek to demonstrate that Les Damnés de la terre is, in effect, an anthem that draws its significance from the Internationale, but one that rethinks the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that acted in complicity with colonialism.
Fanon argues, is a useless phase.
Focussing on the pitfalls of national culture, Nguyen Nghe identifies in Fanon's revolutionary politics vestiges of subjectivism drawn from the Sartrean existential phenomenology that was fashionable at the time, and he chides him for promoting the mythology of the peasantry's 'redemptive' violence as a panacea against the ills of colonialism. 8 Unlike Fanon, Nghe argues that the national bourgeoisie did not represent a useless phase in the process of decolonization. 9 Fanon's revolutionary politics, he claims, misleads his readers into believing that the peasantry alone expresses the spontaneity of the masses, whereas the mobilization of the peasantry would not have been possible without the political organization provided by the national bourgeoisie. 10 He criticizes Fanon for overlooking the significance of class alliance in the revolution, an alliance which was crucial in marshalling Algerian nationalism; he also criticizes him for confusing the proletariat with the petty bourgeoisie. 11 In Nghe's view, Fanon, whilst highlighting the privileges of the working class in comparison to the impoverished peasantry, fails to comprehend that the former was better positioned in relation to the mechanisms of power: its privileges enabled it to grasp the extent of colonial exploitation and to instigate resistance. 12 Put simply, according to Nghe, Fanon seems oblivious to the historical totality of the Algerian revolution which had its bases in the city and to the fact that the peasants who engaged in armed struggle received their political education from bourgeois intellectuals who lived in the city. 13 In other words, the interaction between the city and the countryside was crucial in determining the history of the revolutionary movement. For Nghe, then, the working class in Algeria's colonial cities and the immigrants in mainland France were not disinterested bystanders but played a crucial role. 14 He therefore criticizes Fanon for waxing lyrical about the peasantry and idealizing its armed resistance. Nghe effectively turns Fanon's argument on its head: without the nationalist leaders, the peasants who were influenced by the maraboutic religious leaders in the pay of the colonial administration would have been incapable of harnessing the revolution. 15 Nghe also calls into question Fanon's international politics, dismissing his call to the ex-colonized nations to abandon the chimera of following the path taken by Europe. 16 More specifically, he criticizes Fanon for his conception of a new humanism to be founded in the Third World and for his politics of non-alignment. Nghe contends that the Third World, in the rhetoric of Fanon, was vacuous and could not provide the foundations for political or historical development. He pours scorn on Fanon for sitting on the ideological fence of ThirdWorld neutrality: it was not a question of choosing between East and West, or better still between the Third World and Europe, but between two differing conceptions of the world, namely capitalism and communism. As persuasive and as memorable as this kind of critique might be, it nevertheless glosses over the specificities of the context out of which Fanon intervened. To have a better understanding of his Third-Worldism and his ideological neutrality, I want now to consider Nghe's critique in the light of the PCF's problematic political stance vis-à-vis the colonial question.
'Assimilationist' politics and colonial fascism
In the early 1930s, the Comintern altered its strategy on the colonial question by abandoning the class-against-class policy in favour of an anti-fascist front. After the Franco-Soviet Pact, the PCF underwent a process of nationalization, renouncing its internationalist stance all the better to focus on French domestic affairs. In order to thwart the rise of fascism, Maurice Thorez joined the Front populaire and sought subsequently to extend the alliance with the right in 1939, well after Blum's centre-left coalition government collapsed. 17 There was, however, a perceptible shift in the colonial policies of the PCF: the anti-fascist front ostensibly eclipsed the colonial question and Thorez jettisoned the anticolonial policies which the party previously advocated in the Riff War. This change of strategy exacerbated the close relationship that the Etoile nord-africaine (ENA) had established with the PCF in the 1920s.
In June 1936, Blum banned the ENA from attending the Congrès musulman algérien. After its dissolution in 1937, the party re-emerged as the Parti du peuple algérien (PPA), championing decolonization. The PPA opposed not only the PCF but also the 'élus' and Oulemas for supporting the Blum-Viollette Bill in 1937. The failure of the latter raised concerns that Algerian nationalism might be hijacked by fascism. In February 1939, just a few months before the outbreak of the Second World War, Thorez visited Algeria. On 11 February, he delivered a speech in Algiers defining the party's position with regards to the colonial question and the issue of fascism. 18 Thorez's representation of Algeria as a 'nation-in-formation' chimed with Gabriel Audisio's and Albert Camus's assimilationist rhetoric refusing the dichotomous language of colonialism and ran counter to the celebration of the génie helléno-latin in Louis Bertrand's novel Le Sang des races (1899). 19 If, in the symbiosis of cultures, Bertrand maintained the supremacy of the Latin conquerors, in Le Sel de la mer, by contrast, Audisio denounced Bertrand's 'Afrique latine' as an instrument of coloniality, proposing instead a 'Mediterranean humanism' transcending racial and nationalistic chauvinism, contrasting the fascistic ideology of totalitarianism with the 'sens vivant de la communauté'. 20 Under the auspices of the PCFand two days after Thorez addressed the party -Camus made his presentation to the Maison de la culture in Algiers. Taking his cue from Thorez and Audisio, he differentiated his Mediterranean from Bertrand's 'Méditerranée abstraite et conventionnelle', the Mediterranean '[du] plagiat humain', characterized by its 'génie militaire' and its 'image académique'. 21 Bertrand was one of the intellectuals who supported Mussolini's colonial endeavour in Ethiopia, and Camus denounced the proponents of Latinity for their pro-fascistic tendencies. 22 The Mediterranean was an important strategic site in the fight against fascism.
Thorez's intervention in Algeria -his pronouncements hailing Algeria as a nation-in-formation, as a melting pot in which twenty races merged to form one nationhood -was a rebuttal of Bertrand's racist discourse. In his speech, supplanting the notion of race with that of nationality, Thorez affirmed:
Nous, communistes, nous ne connaissons pas les races. Nous ne voulons connaître que les peuples.
[…] Il y a la nation algérienne qui se constitue historiquement et dont l'évolution peut être facilitée, aidée par l'effort de la République française.
[…] Il y a une nation algérienne qui se constitue, elle aussi, dans le mélange de vingt races. 23 At the PCF's ninth congress, held in Arles on 29 December 1937, Thorez had reiterated Lenin's idea that 'le droit au divorce ne signifiait pas l'obligation de divorcer'. 24 He had warned that the anti-colonialist agenda could only help fascism promote its movement in the colonies:
Si la question décisive du moment, c'est la lutte victorieuse contre le fascisme, l'intérêt des peuples coloniaux est dans leur union avec le peuple de France et non dans une attitude qui pourrait favoriser les entreprises du fascisme et placer, par exemple, l'Algérie, la Tunisie et le Maroc, sous le joug de Mussolini ou d'Hitler, ou de faire de l'Indochine une base d'opérations pour le Japon militariste. 25 On 11 February 1939, he cautioned the nationalists that 'la victoire du fascisme n'amènerait nullement leur libération et ne solutionnerait pas le problème de leur émancipation'. 26 He stressed the urgent need to rally behind the anti-fascist front and defend the Republic.
Referring to the Blum-Viollette Bill, Thorez was behind the times as he proposed outmoded measures -'ce minimum encore bien modeste […] doit être voté, et le libre exercice de leur culte garanti aux Musulmans' 27 -which had already been rejected. His speech could be interpreted as an attempt to re-mobilize the disenchanted Algerian nationalist movement.
However, after the rejection of the bill, the brand of 'Algerian nationalism' which he reaffirmed in order to keep the 'élus' and Oulemas within the coalition was anachronistically assimilationist. Fanon presents their resistance against colonial fascism as a decolonization of France. 47 Fanon also stresses the contribution of the European minority to the Algerian cause, contending that they provided not only ideological and organizational but also strategic and military support to the FLN. His intervention in 'La Minorité européenne d'Algérie' counteracted the psychological warfare conducted by the Fifth Bureau, which was attempting to fracture the movement of resistance. Referring to the Alleg case, Fanon writes:
Journalism and the Republican tradition
Les Européennes et les Européens arrêtés et torturés par les services de police et les parachutistes français, par leur attitude sous les sévices, ont précisément montré la justesse de cette position du FLN. Pas un Français vraiment qui ait révélé aux policiers colonialistes des choses capitales pour la Révolution. Au contraire, les Européens arrêtés résistaient suffisamment pour permettre aux membres du réseau de disparaître. Le torturé européen s'est comporté comme un authentique militant dans le combat national pour l'indépendance. 48 The European minority was ethnically diverse; religion complicated still further the issue of ethnicity and nationality. A sizeable proportion of the non-Muslim population was Jewish, who were granted political citizenship by the Crémieux laws. 49 Colonial Algeria was essentially a racist state: Fanon maintains that 'on y trouve les différents mécanismes de la psychologie raciste'. 50 Some Jews identified with those who discriminated against them in the past, a paradoxical situation that Albert Memmi describes in his Portrait du colonisé, presenting the social structure of colonial Algeria in the form of a pyramid, with the colonizer at its apex and the colonized Algerians at its base. 51 It is true that the acculturated Jews enjoyed privileges, but these came at a price. In Le Monolinguisme de l'autre, Jacques Derrida bemoans the assimilationist policies which alienated Algerian Jews and led to the 'ossification' and 'necrotization' of their culture. 52 
Between Fanon and Lyotard
In 'Le Colonialisme est un système', Sartre analyzes the logic of colonialism as a manifestation of industrial capitalism that sought new markets for its products. 58 JeanFrançois Lyotard expands on Sartre's critique; according to the figures he provides in La Guerre des Algériens, these markets in North Africa -and principally in Algeria -remained very weak, catering for a very small, predominantly European class. Private investment was directed towards financial services, not industry, thus keeping the economy in a preindustrial state. The colonial administration was against the modernization of the agricultural sector for fear that the fellahs would be promoted to the ranks of the European proletariat, thus undermining social stability. The maintenance of such stability, Lyotard argues, involved the expropriation of eighteen million Muslims in North Africa. 59 Fanon unearths this history of expropriation, as he asserts that colonialism created an immiserated lumpenproletariat. 60 Lyotard concurs with Fanon's assessment of the Algerian war as a peasant revolution.
Seventy percent of Algerian agriculture was not economically viable. The insurgents were peasants: predominantly twenty years of age, they entered the armed struggle because they had nothing to lose; they were born in 1938, a year after the failure of the Blum-Viollette Bill; they were brought up in the dire conditions of the Second World War that saw the majority of the indigenous population in the grip of famine; and at the age of seven they experienced the Sétif massacre. 61 Lyotard underscores that these insurgents' intransigence was determined by colonial violence, by their expropriation, by their immiseration and marginalization; the opening chapter of Les Damnés de la terre sets out the implications of this violence.
Out of touch and at odds with political reality, the conceptual language of the left was rendered obsolete by the colonial question. 62 Lyotard rejects an abstract Marxist approach which conceived of the Algerian conflict as a 'class manifestation'; he refuses to consider the Mouvement national algérien (MNA) -a trade-unionist party which was set up by Messali Hadj as a rival to the FLN and which represented immigrant workers in France and peasants in Algeria -as a brand of Algerian Bolshevism. He is quick to point out that Messalism never represented 'l'avant-garde révolutionnaire du prolétariat algérien'. 63 The 400 000 Algerian workers in France were not an integral part of the French working class. Trotsky's notion of the permanent revolution was meaningless as far as they were concerned because these workers were kept segregated from their French counterparts by a whole culture -and by 350 kilometres of land and sea. 64 There was ostensibly a cultural gap between the two peoples, a gap created by a history of brutal colonialism and exacerbated by a nationalistic conflict.
To fathom the politics that opened up such a gap, it is worth reconsidering from Ce monde compartimenté, ce monde coupé en deux est habité par des espèces différentes. L'originalité du contexte colonial, c'est que les réalités économiques, les inégalités, l'énorme différence des modes de vie, ne parviennent jamais à masquer les réalités humaines. Quand on aperçoit dans son immédiateté le contexte colonial, il est patent que ce qui morcelle le monde c'est d'abord le fait d'appartenir ou non à telle espèce, à telle race. Aux colonies, l'infrastructure économique est également une superstructure. La cause est conséquence: on est riche parce que blanc, on est blanc parce que riche. 65 Class frontiers were consolidated by ethnic barriers to the extent that class attitudes were completely obfuscated or expressed in racial terms. 66 Between those who exploited the means of agricultural production and those who were exploited -the European settlers and the dispossessed fellahs -there was a massive gap that was defined in racial terms. The same gap existed between the European workers and their Algerian counterparts. The Manichaean divide, which Fanon describes in Les Damnés de la terre, represents their compartmentalized existence: a police cordon segregated the European workers that lived in Bad-el-Oued from the Algerian workers in the Casbah. The European and Algerian workers never constituted a community of shared political interests. 67 Even when they were exploited in the same way as the Algerian proletariat, the European workers never identified with the latter as a class.
Identification was expressed in cultural and ethnic terms. The French proletariat never considered that its class interests converged with the class interests of the oppressed/colonized peoples.
According to both Fanon and Lyotard, the Algerian conflict was exacerbated by two types of nationalisms which were at loggerheads: the one was colonialist; the other marshalled the dispossessed Algerian peasantry in its anti-colonial struggle. It is true, as Nghe suggests, that the urban working class and the bourgeois elite played a key role in mobilizing the nationalist movement; it is also true that historical and political factors complicated the Marxist notion of class struggle in colonial Algeria. Lyotard shows how nationalism -be it anticolonial or fascistic -overshadowed such a notion. Although it originated from a tradeunionist movement of working-class immigrants in France, the MTLD, founded in 1946 following the dissolution of the PPA, nevertheless attempted to disavow its class specificity and present itself as the 'parti de masse'. 68 The leaders of the MTLD -the national bourgeoisie to whom Nghe assigns a revolutionary pedagogy -were adamant that there were no social/class distinctions and therefore no class antagonisms in Algeria. Oblivious to the specificities of class, the party appeared as a monolithic organization without a doctrine and could not conceive of a political programme to tackle the problems of the dispossessed masses, namely the peasantry. On the other hand, astutely attentive to the diversity of social/class interests, the FLN promoted an ideology that permeated every aspect of Algerian society, rural and urban alike, working to incorporate the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the lumpenproletariat and the peasantry in the national struggle. It was the only party that managed to mobilize militants from the MTLD, the UDMA and the Oulemas to join the armed struggle. Its centralism was engendered by the struggle. In 1955, the party was no longer controlled by the masses and the bourgeois elements which joined the organization ended up exacerbating its centralist tendency. As a unique and centralized party, the FLN established itself in rural and urban areas and managed henceforth to have complete control over the totality of the Algerian population. Whilst rallying behind the FLN revolutionary movement which represented the masses, Fanon seems to target its centralist and bourgeois propensities in his critique of the pitfalls of nationalism, maintaining that the expropriated peasantry was the only revolutionary class.
The FLN could not be 'l'incarnation du prolétariat algérien' but was a sort of union sacrée of workers, peasants and petty bourgeois. 69 The 'proletariat', 'middle class', 'bourgeoisie' and the 'peasantry' are not abstract entities but are determined by the specificities of colonial history and politics. The peasantry was specifically Algerian, a class that constituted the social basis of the nationalist movement: the revolution was nothing but the expression of the expropriated and uprooted Algerian peasantry. It was not an abstract definition of the peasantry that brought about 'class suture' in Algeria; it was the history of colonial exploitation that shaped this class solidarity and gave rise to national consciousness.
In his critique of Fanon, Nghe, eliding the racialized terms of the colonial problematic and the nationalistic discourse which obscured class antagonism, overlooks that this history was defined not in terms of class -i.e. the proletariat or peasantry -but in terms of ethnicity and 
Notes

